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THEORIES OF DEFENSE WHEN TENANTS
ABANDON THE PREMISES BECAUSE
OF THE CONDITION THEREOF
MAX P. RAPACZTHE thought of writing this article evolved several years ago
when the writer was gathering the material for an article on
constructive eviction.' Although it appeared that constructive
eviction was the most frequently employed theory of defense there
were nevertheless several other theories which were used and in cer-
tain types of cases seemed to be more effective and more acceptable
to the courts than constructive eviction.2 In some of them the facts
were not regarded as sufficiently strong to support a constructive
eviction, or it did not seem to fit, but nevertheless a defense was made
out on another theory.3 Sometimes the courts discussed several the-
ories upon which a decision in favor of the tenant could be supported
and it was difficult to determine upon which one the court finally
rested its decision. 4 In quite a number of cases, after a court commit-
ted itself to a defense of constructive eviction, it appeared either ex-
pressly or in the background of the reasoning that, in reality, the de-
cision had another basis and that the declaration of constructive evic-
' 1 De Paul L. Rev. 69 (1951).
'See Anton Petersen v. Slauf Mfg. Co., 251 I11. App. 202, 207 (1929) wherein the
court gave consideration to the possible application of constructive eviction but then
decided the case on the theory that a covenant by the lessor to repair the roof before
the commencement of the lease was a condition precedent to the vesting of an estate
in the lessee; Rosenbloom v. Solomon, 57 Misc. 290, 109 N.Y. Supp. 540 (Co. Ct.,
1907) wherein a lease of a room was made to a surgeon with a covenant to furnish
hot water and the water was made available only in the hallway. The court preferred
not to treat it as a constructive eviction but accepted the defense that it was a breach
of the covenant of quiet enjoyment.
3 Park Ave. M.E. Church v. Barrett, 30 N.Y.S. 2d 667 (Co. Ct., 1941) (the court
stated that it received little assistance from the constructive eviction cases which were
submitted by counsel and thought it best to decide the question of the tenant's rights
to elevator service on the basis of what was intended by the parties under the rule of
the lease concerning such service).
'See Stevens & Co. v. Pratt, 119 Wash. 232, 205 Pac. 10 (1922).
MR. RAPACZ is Professor of Law at De Paul University College of Law. He received
his A.B. and M.A. at the University of Minnesota, and his LL.B. and ].S.D. at Yale
Law School.
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tion was but a conclusion to cap the opinion." In still other cases the
courts pointed out that the pleading was poor because of the lack of
a well formulated theory and that a choice of another theory might
have been more appropriate and would have made the marshalling of
the evidence and the proof of the tenant's case easier.
Although the doctrine of constructive eviction and other doctrines
of defense must have been rather dormant in recent years because of
the tight rental situation in the post war years, the writer has been
informed by his practicing colleagues that the situation is changing
and that lessors who have been defaulting in their promises will be
faced with more cases of abandoning tenants. It is hoped that the
writer's attempted synthesis of the many cases in the field will prove
to be of some value.
Because the doctrine of constructive eviction was fully developed
in the earlier article it will be referred to in this paper only for com-
parative purposes. The same will hold true of the breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment as a defense. It was frequently used in
support of the constructive eviction decisions. It should be added,
however, that in some cases a defense has been worked out on the
theory of a breach of covenant alone.
It would seem almost too elemental to mention that in making out
a defense on any theory a proper regard must be had for the common
law on the responsibility of the lessor for the condition of the prem-
ises, for the terms of the particular lease and for applicable statutes.6
At common law there were no implied covenants in leases as to the
condition of the premises or the fitness thereof for any purpose. It was
left to the tenant, under normal circumstances, to determine the con-
dition and fitness of the premises by inspection and he assumed the
full risk as to the condition. Consequently, the duty to pay the stipu-
lated rent continued even if the premises became untenantable at the
commencement of the lease or became so later and the tenant could
not urge untenantability or unfitness as a defense to suits for rent.7
'See Kesner v. Consumers Co., 255 111. App. 216 (1929) (the basic reasoning was in
terms of a nuisance and a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. The lessor had
allowed one tenant to store picture films endangering another tenant and his em-
ployees).
'This study does not include cases which were decided under untenantability stat-
utes. See 2 Powell, Real Property §§ 235-236 (1950) for an up-to-date coverage of such
cases.
'Hughes v. Westchester Development Corp., 77 F. 2d 550 (App. D.C., 1935); Long-
wood Towers Corp. v. Doyle, 267 Mass. 368, 166 N.E 634 (1929); 2 Powell, Real
Property § 233 (1950); Taylor, Landlord and Tenant § 372 (1904). But see 1 Ameri-
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I. DEFENSES GROUNDED IN CONTRACT THEORY
In resolving cases on basis of contract principles the reasoning gen-
erally revolves around whether there was a "failure of consideration"
or whether various covenants of the lessor and the covenant of the
lessee to pay rent are dependent or independent. Occasionally, a case
is decided simply on the general intention of the parties.
The failure of consideration doctrine.-The "failure of considera-
tion" doctrine has been used as a defense in certain types of cases for
a long time. It probably first came into the law in the cases of eviction
by the lessor or through title paramount.8 When applied to cases of
actual eviction the doctrine seems inherently sound in view of the
ancient theory of rents illustrated in the following quotation taken
from Mr. Gilbert's treatise on rents:
A rent service is something given away by way of retribution to the lessor,
for the land demised by him to the tenant; and consequently, the lessor's title
to the rent is founded upon this; that the land demised is enjoyed by the ten-
ant during the term included in the contract; for the tenant can make no re-
turn for a thing he has not: If, therefore, the tenant be deprived of the thing
letten, the obligation to pay rent ceases; because such obligation has its force
only from the consideration, which was the enjoyment of the thing demised.9
How far this doctrine should be carried is something of a problem
which the writer will not attempt to answer except to point out that
the failure of consideration may be just about as complete in some
cases of modem leasing as if the lessor had actually evicted the tenant.
This doctrine of failure of consideration, sometimes referred to as
the Michigan doctrine, has at times been used as a sufficient defense in
itself'0 while at other times it has been used merely in support of
can Law of Property 267 (1952). There are some exceptions to the general rule, the
principal one being the "furnished house" doctrine. For other exceptions see said text
at 267.
'See Smith v. McEnany, 170 Mass. 26, 48 N.E. 781 (1897); Dyett v. Pendleton, 4
Cow. 581 (N.Y., 1825), on writ of error, 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. Court for Correction of
Errors, 1826); Gilbert, Rents 145 (1838).
' Gilbert, Rents 145 (1838). Italics are ours.
"°Tyler v. Disbrow, 40 Mich. 415 (1879) (the lessor had covenanted that a house
was in good condition and it was not); Vincent v. Central City Loan and Investment
Co., 45 Tex. Civ. App. 36, 99 S.W. 428 (1907) (the lessee predicated his defense
squarely upon the failure of the consideration doctrine and the lessor countered with
the doctrine of independent covenants. The court stated that there was no previously
decided Texas case in point and then held in favor of the lessee upon a finding that
the lessor had breached his covenant to repair a bakers oven when premises were
leased for a bakery. The court relied upon the Michigan case). Accord: Davis v.
Shepperd, 196 Ark. 302, 117 S.W. 2d 337 (1938); Whittaker v. Holmes, 165 Ark, 1,
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some other theory. In New York the doctrine seemed to have been
strongly approved in the early case of Dyett v. Pendleton" but there-
after it has been used mainly in support of the newer theory of con-
structive eviction which developed very rapidly after that decision.
In other jurisdictions there have been considerable variations in the
applications of the doctrine.12 Sometimes, as if not to push the doc-
trine too far, a court has spoken only in terms of an "impairment" of
the consideration but nevertheless allowed the defense. 13
In calling for any application of the doctrine of failure of consider-
ation it should be remembered that historically most leases of land
were for agricultural purposes and that therefore there could not be
such a total failure of consideration as may happen in numerous cases
of modem leasing of apartments and parts of buildings in urban com-
munities.
The doctrine of dependent covenants.-In bilateral contracts gen-
erally, a substantial breach of a material covenant, the covenants be-
ing mutually dependent under normal circumstances, will excuse the
other party from further performance. So if a court can be prevailed
upon to accept the application of the same principles to leases, it may
offer a good defense to suits for rent in at least certain types of cases
if the tenant has abandoned the premises. 14
To obtain an understandable perspective of the doctrine and its
application one must take into consideration the historical develop-
263 S.W. 788 (1924) (building destroyed by fire); Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348,
31 N.E. 286 (1892) (the court found an implied contract of fitness for immediate
enjoyment in the lease of a furnished house for the summer at the seashore).
" 4 Cow. 581 (N.Y., 1825), on writ of error, 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y., 1826).
"See 1 Am. Law of Property 282 (1952).
"Dolph v. Barry, 165 Mo. App. 659, 148 S.XV. 196 (1912) (held, that a breach of
covenant by the lessor to repair a store roof justified abandonment though the repairs
could have been easily made by the tenant).
"'Berman v. Shelby, 93 Ark. 472, 125 S.W. 124 (1910) (the lessor covenanted to
put a hot water heater in the bathroom on the second floor in a rooming house. He
installed the heater in the kitchen on the first floor so that to light it the user had to
come downstairs. The court considered it to be a material change from the terms of
the contract and declared the covenants to be mutual and the breach by the lessor
was held to be a complete defense to a suit for rent after the abandonment of the
premises). Barnes v. Strohecker, 17 Ga. 340 (1855) (the lessor covenanted to make,
seemingly, substantial repairs to a house). Accord: Higgins v. Whiting, 102 N.J.L.
279, 131 At. 879 (S. Ct., 1926) (the lessor covenanted to furnish heat in apartment.
The court held that the covenants were mutual and dependent). On the legal effect
of covenants being interdependent generally, see 1 Tiffany Real Property 135 (3rd
ed., 1939).
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ment of covenants in the field of land law and of contract law. Histori-
cally, covenants to pay rent and covenants of the lessor have been
treated as independent rather than dependent, or as conditions prece-
dent.1" The lessor was supposed to have furnished the main part of
the consideration for the rent when he conveyed the "estate" in the
land and a breach of covenant thereafter was regarded as sufficiently
compensated for by awarding money damages.16 The general attitude
of the courts came to be that if the lease did not modify the old com-
mon law principles, they applied. Sometimes the courts, after deciding
against the tenant's defense, added insult to injury by telling him that
he could have stipulated about the matter in the lease! The thinking
along such lines, which is not realistic anyway,17 has sometimes been
carried to the point of the ridiculous as the following quotation
attests:
.. . And he could have stipulated in his contract that no restaurant should
be adjoining him, and that, if one was so established, and by reason thereof
his office became infested with rats, or filled with odors therefrom, that the
lease should then terminate. .... 18
Not having done so, the defendant was held liable for the office rent
subsequent to the abandonment.
The adherence of the courts to the old historical view that cove-
nants in leases are independent has been rather persistent. When the
old rule that mutual promises in a bilateral contract are independent
and unconditional unless the parties, by some expression of intention,
make them otherwise, gave way to the new rule that when two per-
formances are mutually promised in a bilateral contract, they are con-
currently conditional and dependent, the courts continued to adhere
to the old rule regarding covenants in leases.' 9 To ameliorate some of
the injustices resulting from the application of the old rule, the courts
5Lewis & Co. v. Chisolm, 68 Ga. 40 (1881); 1 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant § 51
(1910); Costigan, Performance of Contracts 63 (1927).
" 3 Williston, Contracts § 890 (rev. ed., 1936).
' Most lessees do not have the bargaining power to obtain the insertion of protec-
tive provisions even if they give thought to the matter.
" Lumpkin v. Provident Loan Society Inc., 15 Ga. App. 816, 84 S.E. 216, 217 (1915)
(the court denied a defense of constructive eviction). See also, note 37 Harv. L. Rev.
896 (1924) for the unrealistic view that one who takes a furnished house does not
need the protection of an implied warranty of fitness doctrine because he can exact
an express warranty.
" See 3 Corbin, Contracts § 656, at 616 n. 11 (1951) for such a transition in the Eng-
lish courts at about 1792 and Lord Kenyon's thinking that some of the old decisions
"outrage common sense."
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resorted to other devices, particularly the doctrine of constructive
eviction, which, if liberally applied, can attain the same results as the
doctrine of dependent covenants. Why the courts did not apply the
principle of mutual dependency of covenants to leases after that prin-
ciple became established for ordinary bilateral contracts is explainable
partly on the estate theory of leases and partly on the ground that
the principle of independent covenants in leases was thoroughly set-
tled before the law of mutually dependent promises was established
in contract law. 20
Nevertheless, in spite of history and the general reluctance of the
courts to deviate from principles established in land law, there has
been a considerable development of the mutuality of the material
covenants in leases, and the current tendency is in that direction. The
earliest and the strongest recognition for the doctrine seems to have
been obtained in cases involving covenants of the lessor to make re-
pairs. Barnes v. Strohecker21 is a century old case, wherein the lessor
seems to have covenanted to make substantial repairs to a house with-
in a reasonable time and did not do so. The Georgia Supreme Court
reversed a judgment for the lessor and determined that the covenants
were to be treated as mutually dependent. A more recent case in
which the doctrine of mutuality of repair covenants was expounded
most vigorously and the tenant excused is lngraham v. Fred.22 The
lease was of a storehouse for two years at a rental of $4800 payable
$200 a month. The tenant conducted a pawnshop and clothing busi-
ness and the premises became untenantable during the first year be-
cause of a leaking roof which the lessor failed to repair. The Texas
Court severely criticized the English Rule of independence of cove-
nants in leases, as being arbitrary and unduly favorable to the lessor,
with no legal or equitable basis for it in America.
If the doctrine of dependent covenants in leases is accepted in a
jurisdiction, there still remains the question of determining whether
they be dependent or independent in the particular lease. That deter-
mination seems to depend upon the intention of the parties, the mate-
riality of the breach and whether the breach goes only to a part of the
consideration which could be compensated in damages.23 If there was
generally a substantial performance by the lessor, he can sue for
o 3 Williston, Contracts § 890 (rev. ed., 1936).
' 17 Ga. 340 (1855).
2 10 S.W. 298 (Tex. Civ. App., 1919).
I Tiffany, Real Property 135 (3rd ed., 1939).
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future rents though the tenant has quit the premises.2 4 To justify
abandonment the breach must be substantial and of some essential
covenant.25
To avail himself of the doctrine of dependent covenants the tenant
must vacate the premises, as is the case in constructive eviction. 20 If
the tenant continues in possession, having had the use of the premises,
he is deemed to have waived his rights to stop the payment of rent.27
Cases decided on general intent.-There are a few cases in which
the courts apparently proceed upon the general intention of the
parties without any express reference to a failure of consideration or
dependency of covenants. In a fairly recent case a New York court
stated that it received little assistance from constructive eviction cases
submitted by counsel and concluded that the question of the tenant's
rights concerning elevator service had best be decided on the basis of
"what was intended" by the parties under the rule of the lease relative
to elevator services. 28
Although the contractual theories of defense in one form or an-
other have not been asserted with great frequency and sometimes not
very clearly,29 they would seem to merit further extension and devel-
2 Humes v. Gardner, 22 Misc. 333, 49 N.Y. Supp. 147 (S. Ct. App. Term, 1898).
'United Cigar Stores of America v. Hollister, 185 Minn. 534, 242 N.W. 3 (1932)
(the defendant had a ten year lease for a cigar store, lunch room, soda fountain or
drug store at an annual rental of $7200.00. By the terms of the lease, the lessor was
not to rent any part of the building for like purposes. The lessor made a lease to
another in the remaining part of the building for an old-fashioned, ice-cooled soda
fountain of small capacity four months after the defendant had vacated. This, the
defendant contended, was such a breach as to terminate his liability for future rents.
Held, that such a breach goes only to a part of the consideration, and was merely
incidental to the main purpose of the lease, and did not warrant a rescission); United
Cigar Stores Co. v. Burt, 142 So. 370 (La. App., 1932). But cf. University Boat Club
v. Deakin, 265 Ill. 257, 106 N.E. 790 (1915), Comment 10 Il. L.Rev. 61 (1915) wherein
the court held that a covenant by the lessor that he would not lease to others who
make a specialty of selling pearls, was such a vital part of a "bilateral contract" that
the defendant could terminate his lease. The court said that it was idle to say that an
action for damages for breach of contract would afford an ample remedy. See 3 Cor-
bin, Contracts 701 (1951) that the question of the materiality of the breach which
will justify abandonment differs with the circumstances and that there is a lack of
harmony in the decisions.
'Lee v. Ellis, 169 Ark. 556, 275 S.W. 889 (1925); Banister Real Estate Co. v. Ed-
wards, 282 S.W. 138 (Mo. App., 1926).
'Lee v. Ellis, 169 Ark. 556, 275 S.W. 889 (1925).
University Boat Club v. Deakin, 265 111. 257, 106 N.E. 790 (1914); Park Avenue
M.E. Church v. Barrett, 30 N.Y.S. 2d 667 (Co. Ct., 1941). See also: Craven v. Skobba,
108 Minn. 165, 121 N.W. 625 (1909).
'See Stanoyevich' Fund v. Steinacher, 125 N.J.L. 326, 15 A. 2d 772 (1940) wherein
the court simply stated that a breach of covenant by the lessor to repair a furnace
justified the tenant in breaching his covenant to pay rent.
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opment because an application of the old estate theory of leases seems
inappropriate in many cases today. The contract theory of leases is a
recognition of the fact that the parties to a modern lease are thinking
in terms of contract rather than in terms of the estates concept and
decisions are made more on the basis of intention of the parties in
each case rather than on technical and sometimes outmoded doctrines
of property law.30
It is the opinion of the writer that the courts are relying on con-
tractual doctrines to decide cases more than is apparent in the cases.
Professor Corbin, the author of a recent treatise on contracts, in dis-
cussing constructive eviction, puts the matter much more strongly in
the following language:
The word "constructive" shows that it is not the law of property that the
court is applying, but the law of mutual dependency in contracts; it is believed
that the time has come to recognize this fact openly and to apply the flexible
rules of contract law in determining whether a breach by either party is so
material as to discharge the other from further duty .... 1
The general recognition of contract principles which Professor
Corbin desires will not be easily attained. Witness a writer on leases in
New York recently stating that the "core" of lease law in the state is
that a lease is a conveyance and that we are dealing very little with
the law of contracts. 2
II. FAILURE TO PERFORM CONDITIONS PRECEDENT
The writer deems it advisable to sound a warning at the outset re-
garding the observation of distinctions between a promise (covenant)
and a condition. Professor Williston criticizes strongly a nomenclature
which fails to recognize the distinction because of the great differ-
ences in legal results if we have the one or the other.33 The following
quotations might be helpful in observing the distinctions:
'oSee 3 Williston, Contracts 2520 (rev. ed., 1936), for a sympathetic attitude toward
a greater use of the contract theory. But see, 1 Tiffany, Real Property 135 (3rd ed.,
1939) for a statement that the contractual doctrine of dependent covenants would
seem to be inapplicable to leases on the ground that a breach of the lessor's covenant
goes only to a part of the consideration.
" 3 Corbin, Contracts 701 (1951).
82 Friedman, The Nature of a Lease in New York, 33 Cornell L.Q. 165 (1947).
'3 Williston, Contracts 1911 (rev. ed., 1936). See Mclsaac v. Hale, 104 Conn. 134,
132 Ad. 916 (1926) for a good lease case and the consequences' which flow from a
condition precedent in a lease. See also Papanastos v. Heller, 227 Mass. 74, 116 N.E.
732 (1917).
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The distinction between a promise or a covenant on the one hand, and a
condition on the other, both in their legal effect and in their wording, is ob-
vious and familiar. Breach of promise subjects the promisor to liability in
damages, but does not necessarily excuse performance on the other side.
Breach or non-occurrence of a condition prevents the promisee from acquir-
ing a right or deprives him of one, but subjects him to no liability.3 4
A condition precedent is one calling for performance of some act after the
contract is entered into on performance of which the obligation depends.a5
Whether certain language in a lease creates a condition or a promise
is a matter, as in other contracts, of intention and construction." In
making the determination one must bear in mind the familiar principle
that the courts do not like to find conditions precedent unless com-
pelled to do so by the language of the lease37 or contract.8 The
equities of the case and the possibility of injustice resulting from find-
ing a condition precedent also receive due consideration. 9
The condition precedent may be a condition to the existence of
any lease or a prerequisite to a duty of immediate performance under
an existing lease.40 As to the former, it may be shown by parol evi-
dence that the writing was never executed or delivered as a lease.4
The parties may make performance of a comparatively trivial duty
a condition precedent and the contract will be dealt with as made.42
2 3 Williston, Contracts 1909 (rev. ed., 1936).
'Elson v. Jones, 42 Idaho 349, 350, 245 Pac. 95, 96 (1926); See also, Costigan, Per-
formance of Contracts 12 (1927).
" McIsaac v. Hale, 104 Conn. 134, 132 At. 916 (1926); Petersen v. Slauf Mfg. Co.,
251 Ill. App. 202 (1929).
"
7Laveites v. Gottlieb, 115 Misc. 218, 187 N.Y. Supp. 452 (S. Ct. Sp. Term, 1921)
(the court was unable to determine whether it was a covenant or condition because
of poor pleading and insufficient evidence as to the language of the lease).
8 3 Williston, Contracts 1910 (rev. ed., 1936); Rest., Contracts § 261 (1932).
'In McIsaac v. Hale, 104 Conn. 134, 132 Atl. 916 (1926) the court concluded that
it could deal out more justice to the parties according to the equities of the case by
holding that certain language did not create a condition precedent to the payment
of an increased rent upon the completion of specified improvements. See also Doo-
little v. Selkirk, 7 Misc. 72, 28 N.Y. Supp. 43 (N.Y. C.P., 1894) (a promise by the
lessor to put in a new furnace did not produce a condition precedent that it would
effectively heat the place but merely gave an independent covenant. The court deemed
it more just to treat it as a covenant because the tenant could have made repairs to
the new furnace at a cost of $25.00 which would have brought forth the necessary
heat).
40 Costigan, Performance of Contracts 1-4 (1927); 3 Williston, Contracts 1913 (rev.
ed., 1936).
'Hagen v. Moch, 249 Mich. 511, 229 N.W. 629 (1930); 9 Wigmore, Evidence,
§ 2410 (3rd ed., 1940); Friedman, The Nature of a Lease in New York, 33 Cornell
L. Q. 165 (1947).
"Watzman v. Unatin, 101 W. Va. 41, 131 S.E. 874 (1926); 3 Williston, Contracts
§ 675 (rev. ed., 1936).
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If a condition is found it must be strictly complied with or no liability
can arise on the promise which the condition qualifies.48
The doctrine of conditions precedent has been used with particular
effectiveness in cases where lessors covenanted to make substantial
improvements or repairs prior to the beginning of the term when the
premises have been leased for a known use. 44 In Papanastos v. Heller,45
a lessor agreed, to "fix up the demised premises above the store in
good and satisfactory condition" which the parties understood as
meaning before the beginning of the lease. The court stated that con-
sidering the facts and circumstances and the language used, it could
not be considered as the "usual" covenant to repair-that it was a
condition precedent to any estate vesting in the lessee. The following
excerpt is indicative of the attitude of the courts in such cases:
We think on principle it may be laid down as a general rule that where a
landlord demises premises for a known use on the part of the lessee and the
lessor and lessee covenant that repairs of a substantial nature should be made
prior to the beginning of the term, it must be held to be the intention of the
parties that the provision for repairs be construed to be a condition precedent
rather than a covenant, and that failure on the part of the lessor to keep such
promise will justify an abandonment and rescission of the lease. 46
Under another view such a lease may be treated as an executory
contract to take a lease.47
Instead of being a condition precedent to the vesting of an estate
in the lessee, the condition may be precedent to the payment of rent
under an existing lease. 4" So where tenants in possession quit the
'
3Bacon v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Co., 22 Misc. 592, 49 N.Y. Supp. 620
(S. Ct. Tr. Term, 1898) (the lessor provided that in case of partial destruction of the
premises, the lessor should rebuild "as speedily as possible" and that rent should cease
in the meantime. Held, that the lessor's performance within a reasonable time was a
condition precedent and the tenant was justified in abandoning the lease and the obli-
gation to pay rent ceased).
"Brown v. DeGraff, 183 App. Div. 177, 170 N.Y. Supp. 445 (3rd Dep't, 1918) (in-
volved the erection of a certain type of building by the lessor. Parol evidence was
allowed to show that it was a condition precedent); La Farge v. Mansfield, 31 Barb.
Ch. 345 (N.Y.S. Ct., 1859) (the lessor agreed to make a store, already under con-
struction at the time of the leasing, ready for occupancy by a certain date and fire
destroyed it before said date).
'227 Mass. 74, 116 N.E. 732 (1917).
"Petersen v. Slauf Mfg. Co., 251 111. App. 202, 207 (1929).
"7Banker's Mtge. Co. v. Robson, 123 Kan. 746, 256 Pac. 997 (1927).
"Epping v. Devanney, 28 Ga. 422 (1859); Obermeyer v. Nichols, 6 Binn. 159, 6
Am. Dec. 439 (Pa., 1813). See also Kulawitz v. Pacific Woodenware & Paper Co.,
25 Cal. 2d 664, 155 P. 2d 24 (1945) (the lessor covenanted not to "let or permit" occu-
pation of any other space or storeroom in the same building for the purpose of con-
ducting a furniture store. The court held the provision to be a condition precedent
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premises after the lessor failed to repair fire damage "forthwith" 49 or
"as speedily as possible," 50 as called for by the leases, the tenants were
held justified in quitting and terminating their leases on the grounds
that the promises were conditions precedent to the obligations to pay
rents. The court stated, in the second case, that any other view would
be unfair to the tenants.
This right of a lessee to require the lessor's compliance with the
covenant to improve or to repair the premises as a condition prece-
dent to the obligation to pay rent may be waived if the tenant takes
possession or retains possession unduly knowing of the breach of the
condition.5 If the repairs are to be made after the commencement of
the lease, as within a reasonable time, there is no waiver by taking
possession and the tenant may quit later if the lessor defaults.5 2
It was previously stated that the doctrine of conditions precedent
has been used with particular effectiveness in cases where substantial
repairs or improvements were covenanted. The opinions of the
Appellate Courts give almost no indication that the doctrine has been
urged in cases wherein the promised repairs or improvements are not
so significant. It seems that the application of the same principles of
construction and enforcement of conditions in leases as in other con-
tracts could broaden the application of the doctrine and would be
justified in modem leasing. It may be queried whether the courts are
attaching undue significance to the materiality of the covenant and
the degree of lessened enjoyment in the same manner as in the cases
of conditions. If so, Professor Corbin's observations on the distinctions
between covenants and conditions are to the point. A disregard of a
condition and the consequent right to rescind a lease or to abandon
the premises, places the tenant at a great disadvantage. Suits for dam-
ages are not a very satisfactory recourse for the average tenant and
so he is constrained to remain making the best of a situation which is
not to his liking and not in accord with his bargain.
to the payment of rent and sustained a finding of constructive eviction by the trial
court upon a breach by the lessor and abandonment of the premises by the tenant).
Accord: University Boat Club v. Deakin, 265 Ill. 257, 106 N.E. 790 (1914).
'"Barbour v. Waterston, 276 Mich. 304, 267 N.W. 845 (1936).
' Bacon v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 22 Misc. 592, 49 N.Y. Supp.
620 (S. Ct. Tr. Term, 1898).
'Bankers Mtge. Co. v. Robson, 123 Kan. 746, 256 Pac. 997 (1927); La Farge v.
Mansfield, 31 Barb. Ch. 345 (N.Y. S. Ct., 1859).
'Craven v. Skobba, 108 Minn. 165, 121 N.W. 625 (1909).
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There are two cases, Papanastos v. Heller" and Craven v. Skohba 54
which might well be made more frequently applicable to modem
leases of apartments or houses. In the first there was a ten year lease
of a store building with seven rooms used for habitation on the second
floor. The lessor had covenanted to "fix up the demised premises
above the store in good and satisfactory condition." This not being
done before the commencement of the term as contemplated by the
parties, the court held that the covenant was a condition to the vest-
ing of the estate in the lessee, although the court stated that the ex-
tent of the contemplated repairs did not appear. The tenant was
allowed to rescind the lease and to recover the rent paid in advance
on the first month. In the second case the lessor had covenanted to do
what is commonly referred to as "decorating and painting" within
and outside of a house which had been leased for one year beginning
September 1st at $40 per month. The defendant took possession on
September 9th at which time all the work was done except the outside
painting which was not done when the defendant abandoned the
premises on November 9th after several requests that the work be
completed. The court held that the defendant was not liable for the
balance of the term. The court seems to have treated the covenant as
a condition. It emphasized that the degree of lessened enjoyment was
not important and that the rights of the parties were to be measured
by the terms of their written contract and not by the consequences
flowing from the breach thereof.
III. FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT AND REPRESENTATION
There is a variety of cases in which tenants have been held justified
in terminating a lease and abandoning the premises because of fraudu-
lent concealment of the condition or because of fraudulent repre-
sentations made prior to the inception of the lease. In a few of these
cases it has been stated that such conduct results in a constructive
eviction but more generally the disposition is made simply on the
basis of fraud. There is close scrutiny of all allegations of fraud and
on occasion the courts have warned against false allegations by les-
sees.55 A careless or liberal application of the doctrine of fraud could
result in a virtual denial of the doctrine of caveat emptor.
5'227 Mass. 74, 116 N.E. 732 (1917).
108 Minn. 165, 121 N.W. 625 (1909).
' Fifty Associates v. Berger Dry Goods Co., Inc., 275 Mass. 509, 176 N.E. 643 (1931)
(the tenant alleged defective drainage but the court concluded that he had quit for
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Generally speaking, neither party to a contract . . . is bound to disclose facts
known to him which might prevent the other from entering into such a con-
tract, and where no confidential relationship exists between them actual mis-
representations are, therefore, usually necessary to constitute fraud .... 56
To constitute fraud and justify abandonment the concealment
must be of material facts which could not be discovered by an ordi-
nary inspection and which seriously interfere with the enjoyment.5 7
It has been said that it would be unconscionable and unjust to apply
the doctrine of caveat emptor in such cases.58 But a nondisclosure of
some objectionable feature, where the lessee had the same opportunity
to observe it as the lessor, and the lessor having made no promises or
assurances, is not a fraudulent concealment.5" As to whether there is
any duty to disclose objectionable past history of the premises there
are differences of opinion. 60
Where the lessee is in a better position to ascertain the condition
than the lessor because of the nature of the business to be carried on
business reasons). See Stovall v. Newell, 158 Ore. 206, 75 P. 2d 346 (1938) (the court
characterized the oral representations of the lessor's agent, that an apartment was in
first class condition, as mere "puffing or dealers' talk.").
"Leech v. Husbands, 34 Del. (4 W. W. Harr.) 362, 365, 152 At. 729, 732 (1930)
(involved the question of whether a failure of the lessor to disclose infestation of an
apartment with vermin would constitute a fraud. The court expressed a view strongly
unfavorable to the defense).
'7 Wallace v. Lent, 1 Daly 481 (N.Y. C.P., 1865) (a case with an excellent analysis.
The lessor had failed to disclose that a house was untenantable because of sewer gas
and that the previous tenant had quit because of it). Accord: Capitol Amusement Co.
v. Anheuser Busch Inc., 94 Colo. 372, 30 P. 2d 264 (1934); Perkins v. Marsh, 179
Wash. 362, 37 P. 2d 689 (1934) (the lessor had failed to disclose seepage in a base-
ment in rainy seasons which interfered with conducting the business of retailing auto-
mobiles for which purpose the premises were leased. Held, a fraudulent conceal-
ment); Scudder v. Marsh, 224 I11. App. 355 (1922) (the lessor failed to disclose inade-
quacy of a furnace in a house, a thing which could have been determined only by
experts); Haines v. Downey, 86 111. App. 373, 374 (1899).
'Scudder v. Marsh, 224 111. App. 355 (1922); Wallace v. Lent, I Daly 481 (N.Y.
C.P., 1865).
'Blake v. Dick, 15 Mont. 236, 38 Pac. 1072 (1895); Twibill v. Brown, I Pa. Co. Ct.
Rep. 350 (1886).
'Weeks v. Braverman, I Daly 99 (N.Y. C.P., 1860) (a failure to disclose that a
house had been used for prostitution with the assent of the lessor, was not a fraudu-
lent withholding of information because, said the court, there was no obligation to
disclose it, and caveat emptor governed). Accord: Twibill v. Brown, I Pa. Co. Ct.
Rep. 350 (1886) (the lessor had failed to disclose that the premises had been previ-
ously used as an opium den. The court thought that it was up to the tenant to inquire
about the previous uses). But see, Minneapolis Co-operative Co. v. Williamson, 51
Minn. 3, 38 Am. St. Rep. 476, 478 (1892) in support of a contrary view on the
ground that .such things are not open to inspection and there may be nothing to put
a tenant on inquiry.
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by the lessee, there is no duty of disclosure."1 All the more if a lessor
is not aware of the alleged defects, there can be no fraudulent con-
cealment.62 Defects resulting from adjoining premises not owned by
the lessor raise no duty of disclosure.63
To take advantage of the defense of fraudulent concealment, the
tenant may have to rescind the lease within a reasonable time after
discovery of the defective condition and quit the premises.
6 4
As in cases of fraudulent concealment, so in cases of fraudulent
representation, a lessee may abandon the premises and he will havte a
good defense to suit for subsequent rents if he can prove his allega-
tions.65 The parol evidence rule cannot be invoked to prevent a show-
ing of fraud in the execution of the lease, it not being an attempt to
vary a written lease but rather to show that the lease was procured by
fraud and therefore has no legal effect. 66
In determining whether a defense of fraudulent representation has
been made out the courts are again ever mindful of the doctrine of
caveat emptor and of allowing it proper scope. So a representation
made in regard to a condition which could readily be seen has been
held not to constitute fraud. 67 But any intentional misrepresentation
of material facts when the lessee does not have access to means of in-
formation will vitiate the lease regardless of the lessor's lack of knowl-
edge that it was true or false.68 If a lessee enters into a lease upon false
representations of the lessor, who has superior means of information,
the doctrine of caveat emptor does not apply because the lessee did not
have an equal opportunity to pass judgment.69 So when a lessee was
told by the lessor that a house was in "good condition" after being
'IChapin Publicity Corp. v. Saybrook Holding Corp., 103 N.J. Eq. 65, 142 Atl. 184
(1928) (involved the strength of a wall).
"Home Life Ins. Co. v. Franklin, 303 I. App. 146, 24 N.E. 2d 874 (1940).
' Hazlett v. Powell, 30 Pa. (6 Casey) 293 (1858).
"Leach v. Husbands, 34 Del. (4 W. W. Harr.) 362, 365, 152 Atl. 729, 732 (1930).
'Gamble-Robinson Co. v. Buzzard, 65 F. 2d 950 (C.A. 8th, 1933); Goldberg v.
Reed, 97 N.J.L. 170, 116 Atl. 429 (Ct. of Err. & App., 1922).
"Gamble-Robinson Co. v. Buzzard, 65 F. 2d 950 (C.A. 8th, 1933) (a building
leased for storage purposes deteriorated so that it became unsafe. The court allowed
proof of the lessor's oral representations that the building had been overhauled and
repaired before the lease was made and that it was suitable for the lessee's purposes);
Meyers v. Rosenback, 5 Misc. 337, 25 N.Y. Supp. 521 (N.Y. City Ct., 1893).
'Vessel v. Reisfield, 152 Misc. 464, 273 N.Y. Supp. 778 (N.Y. Munic. Ct., 1934).
"Purcell v. Teller, 10 Cal. 488, 51 Pac. 436 (1897).
" Mitchell v. Zimmerman, 4 Tex. 75, 51 Am. Dec. 717 (1849).
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informed by the lessee that the lessee was not a good judge of such
things and preferred to rely upon the lessor, the court held that the
case should have gone to the jury as to such representations being made
-that it was to be regarded as a strong feature of the tenant's case if he
relied upon the lessor. 70 Likewise, where a prospective tenant was
suggesting that he wished to employ a plumber to inspect a drain
pipe and the lessor assured him that everything was in "good order,"
the tenant had a good defense if he abandoned the premises because
of sewer gas arising therefrom. 71
Sometimes lessors try to preclude the use of the defenses of fraudu-
lent representation and concealment by inserting provisions which
seemingly waive them. Such provisions do not fare well in the courts.
So a provision in a lease that the lessee received the premises in "good
order" did not bar the lessee from showing that the lease was pro-
cured by fraud. 72 Likewise a provision that the lessee was-not in-
fluenced by any representations did not bar rescission of a lease which
was procured by fraudulent representations.73 The fraudulent repre-
sentations vitiate the lease, 7  and one cannot contract against fraud
nor prevent a showing of fraud by estoppel.75
IV. THE NUISANCE DOCTRINE
As in other fields of law, the nuisance concept has been bandied
about rather loosely in the field of landlord and tenant relations and
is therefore not a very satisfactory tool to Work with. Nevertheless,
there are quite a number of cases wherein the abandonment has been
justified on the theory of a nuisance in one manner or another. A
court may make a finding that the lessor created the nuisance 76 or
that he consented and connived in creating one 7 7 or that it resulted
°Jackson v. Odell, 12 Daly 345 (N.Y. C.P., 1884).
"Wolfe v. Arrot, 109 Pa. 473, 1 Atl. 333 (1885).
"Purcell v. Teller, 10 Cal. 488, 51 Pac. 436 (1897).
"s Oceanic Villas, Inc. v. Godson, 148 Fla. 454, 4 So. 2d 689 (1941).
"Purcell v. Teller, 10 Cal. 488, 51 Pac. 436 (1897); Meyers v. Rosenback, 5 Misc.
337, 25 N.Y. Supp. 521 (N.Y. City Ct., 1893).
"'Oceanic Villas, Inc. v. Godson, 148 Fla. 454, 4 So. 2d 689 (1941).
"' Allott v. Bowers, 168 Ill. App. 573 (1912) (the lessor was noisy in entertaining
guests in his apartment which was above the lessee's apartment); Donovan v. Koehler,
119 App. Div. 51, 103 N.Y. Supp. 935 (2nd Dep't, 1907) (the lessor installed a bowl-
ing alley in his saloon, below the lessee's apartment).
" Lancashire v. Garford Mfg. Co., 199 Mo. App. 418, 203 S.,. 668 (1918).
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through an agency under his control78 and then declare that it was a
constructive eviction as a result of his acts79 or that the nuisance
affected the consideration of the contract.8 0
Just what legal effect the maintenance of a nuisance should have
upon the tenant's right to quit the premises seems to have been first
thoroughly considered in the cases of Pendleton v. Dyett,8' and
Dyett v. Pendleton. 2 In the first case the New York Supreme Court
rejected evidence offered in support of an allegation by the tenant
that the lessor maintained a nuisance in another of his tenements in
the same building in bringing or encouraging lewd women to come
into it, who caused noises and disturbances at night, because of which
the defendant abandoned the premises with his family. The court
seems to have relied a great deal upon the fact that the defendant him-
self could have abated the nuisance and that therefore there was no
moral rnecessity for abandoning the premises. But in the second case
the Court of Errors was of the opinion that the evidence should have
been admitted for the consideration of the jury to establish a con-
structive eviction on the reasoning that a lessor ought not to be en-
couraged to disturb his own tenant, pointing out that even under
feudal law a lessor had a duty of protection.
Ever since those two cases there have been considerable differences
of opinion and sometimes misunderstandings in respect to two points:
(1) What must be the degree of participation by the lessor to consti-
tute a nuisance by the lessor; (2) the duty of the lessor to abate
nuisances caused by others. As to the first point it has been asserted
that the authorities are uniform that the nuisance must be created by,
or due in some measure to, the landlord.88 Although such assertions
are generally true, the courts have found it necessary to warn against
misunderstanding such assertions.84 As to the second point, it is gen-
"Ray Realty Co. v. Holtzman, 234 Mo. App. 802, 119 S.W. 2d 981 (1938); Smith
v. Greenstone, 208 S.W. 628 (Mo. App., 1918) (a toilet in a hallway); Goldberg v.
Read, 97 N.J.L. 170, 116 Atl. 429 (1922).
"Such was the procedure in all of the cases cited in notes 76, 77 and 78 supra.
'°308 East 79th Street Corp. v. Favorite, 111 Fla. 234, 149 So. 625 (1933).
"4 Cow. 581 (N.Y., 1825).
" 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y., 1826).
'McKinney v. Browning, 126 App. Div. 370, 110 N.Y. Supp. 562 (2nd Dep't, 1908);
Tudor City Ninth Unit, Inc. v. Perkett, 143 Misc. 209, 256 N.Y. Supp. 395 (N.Y.
Munic. Ct., 1932).
" See Daly v. Wise, 15 Daly 431, 7 N.Y. Supp. 902 (C.P., 1889) (the court pointed
out that an oft cited case, Bradley v. Di Giocoura, 12 Daly 393, 67 How. Pr. 76 (N.Y.
C.P., 1884) seems to have been greatly misunderstood on the question of whose nui-
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erally asserted that a mere failure of the lessor to abate a nuisance
created by another does not justify abandonment.8 5 But, again, such
statements cannot be accepted without qualification. There has been a
recent tendency, at least in a few jurisdictions, to impose a duty to
abate nuisances caused by other tenants, under some circumstances,
even though not attributable to the lessor, and a failure to abate gives
the tenant a good defense to suits for rent accruing subsequently to
the abandonment of the premises.86
V. THE INTOLERABLE CONDITIONS DOCTRINE
As a general rule a tenant to justify abandonment must somehow
attribute the untenantable condition to his landlord, but in the New
York case of In re Barnard Realty Company v. Bonqwit, 7 the court
justified the abandonment on the ground of an "intolerable condition"
which the lessee "neither causes nor can remedy." The untenant-
ability of an apartment was caused by the "nightly meetings and per-
formances of rats in the walls and ceilings coupled with a most
offensive odor. . . ." The court, after some prefatory remarks on the
sance is the operative factor, although the opinion in the case, says the court, is clear
that it was the landlord's nuisance which led to the decision. The nuisance com-
plained of was sewer gas which escaped because of defective plumbing in an apart-
ment house wherein it was the duty of the lessor to keep the plumbing in repair).
Compare, McGlashan v. Tallmadge, 37 Barb. Ch. 313 (N.Y. S.Ct., 1861) wherein it
was argued that when a house became untenantable because of offensive odors caused
by poor drainage, the lessee should be justified in abandoning the premises even
though there was no wrongful act of the lessor. The majority of the court rejected
the argument but there was a dissent by Bacon, J. See also, DeWitt v. Pierson, 112
Mass. 8 (1873) (held, that the maintenance of a bawdy house by another tenant did
not justify the defendant in abandoning his premises. The court distinguished the
Dyett cases on the ground that those cases involved acts of the lessor).
"DeWitt v. Pierson, 112 Mass. 8 (1873); Cougle v. Densmore, 57 111. App. 591
(1894); Tudor City Ninth Unit, Inc. v. Perkett, 143 Misc. 209, 256 N.Y. Supp. 395
(N.Y. Munic. Ct., 1932).
"Bruckner v. Helfair, 197 Wis. 582, 222 N.W. 790 (1929) (the boisterous conduct
of an overhead tenant was held to be a nuisance which entitled the good tenant to
quit. The court regarded the result as "just and reasonable" and the right to quit as
settled for Wisconsin). Accord: Home Life Ins. Co. v. Breslerman, 168 Misc. 117,
5 N.Y.S. 2d 272 (S.Ct. App. Div., 1st Dep't, 1938); Maple Terrace Co. v. Simpson, 22
S.W. 2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App., 1929) (a little girl and her mother were afraid of a big
police dog kept by another tenant in the building. The court skillfully attributed a
nuisance to the lessor, saying that he "sanctioned" the act of keeping the dog when he
did not abate the nuisance, as he had a power to do under the terms of the lease). See
also, Kesner v. Consumers Storage Co., 255 111. App. 216 (1929) (held, that a lessor, as
the landowner, had a duty to abate a nuisance arising from the storage of films by
another tenant which endangered the defendant tenant's employees. The duty to
abate was predicated upon a city ordinance regulating storage of films).
' 155 App. Div. 182, 139 N.Y. Supp. 1050 (1st Dep't, 1913).
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need of elasticity in the application of common law doctrines to meet
modem conditions, declared that the facts seemed to warrant the
application of the doctrine of constructive eviction.
There is some theoretical difficulty in accepting the conclusion of
constructive eviction in the case because it was seemingly allowed
irrespective of -the landlord's causation.ss The doctrine has received
no support in future cases or texts and the case is being cited only,
and with hesitation, as one of constructive eviction. In the later New
York case of Streep v. Simpson, 9 the court after seemingly approving
the Bonwit decision, was careful to attribute the presence of the bed-
bugs to the landlord at least "in some measure" in support of a judg-
ment for the lessee.
In spite of the theoretical difficulty with the Bonwit case, it is sub-
mitted that it was a realistic and just decision which could well be
followed in similar cases on the reasoning of the cases involving leases
of parts of buildings wherein the courts impose upon the landlord
the duty to keep in condition those parts of the building remaining un-
der his control. Denied relief in such situations, the tenant is faced
with the impossibility of enjoyment and a total loss of rent money
because usually the tenant's right of possession and control is confined
to the inner parts of his apartment and with no control over the
approaches, outer walls, ceilings, et cetera. There is little that he can
do to correct such situations. On the other hand, the lessor has the
necessary control to remedy the defects and he need not take the
losses very long, and in the end he may even obtain the full value of
any expenditures as owner of the building.
The Bonwit case should not be allowed to rest as just another case
of constructive eviction. It is suggested that when a court is faced
with a similar situation, it might try to find a more acceptable theory
to uphold such a decision. Perhaps the "failure of consideration"
theory would be better.
VI. THAT THE RIGHT TO QUIT IS SIMPLY A QUESTION OF FACT
There are some decisions wherein the courts simply state that un-
tenantability is a "question of fact" without a clear discussion of any
'3 Williston, Contracts § 890 (rev. ed., 1936).
' 80 N.Y. Misc. 666, 141 N.Y. Supp. 863 (S. Ct. App. Term, 2nd Dep't, 1913) (the
defendant's apartment became infested with bedbugs without his fault, the bugs hav-
ing come up from the apartment underneath while that was occupied by another
tenant after whose vacation the lessor, with the cooperation of the defendant and an
exterminator, tried to rid the apartment of the vermin but without success).
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principle of law upon which the tenant had the right to quit.90 In still
other cases the courts approach the issue in terms of whether the
tenant was "justified" in quitting without, again, any discussion of
theory.91 Such decisions and reporting have been criticized because
there is no showing that the decision was made upon any legal prin-
ciple which would excuse the tenant.92 That there should be some
legal principle to rely upon before the facts become relevant, was
forcefully pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Bradley v.
DiGiocoura,9 which has become one of the leading cases in con-
structive eviction. Decided at a time when the courts were still in
doubt as to any principle of law which would justify a tenant in
quitting because of sewer gas, Larremore, J. stated that he was in-
clined to the belief that cases of that character would thereafter have
to be decided upon the "distinctive facts" in each case and the court
then affirmed a judgment of constructive eviction. But Beach, J., dis-
senting, declared that he could see no legal principle or theory upon
which to support the judgment even if the premises were made un-
tenantable since there was no implied warranty of fitness, no fraud in
the leasing, no nuisance by the landlord, no statute excusing the ten-
ant, and no act of the landlord preventing the tenant from enjoying
the premises.
VII. UTILITY OF THE VARIOUS THEORIES
The writer would hesitate to say that any particular case which he
read in the preparation of this paper was lost because of a lack of
knowledge of the possible applicable theories or because of a poor
choice of theory. Nevertheless, the courts did indicate in quite a
number of opinions that such may have been the case.
It has been pointed out that a liberal application of constructive
eviction may give the same result as the application of the doctrine
of dependent covenants. Therefore, in jurisdictions where there is
strong adherence to the view that covenants are generally independ-
ent, a plea of constructive eviction, if it fits the facts, would seem
"See Leonard v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 577, 41 N.W. 695 (1889).
' Harthill v. Cook's Ex'r., 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1524, 43 S.W. 705 (1897); Minneapolis
Cooperative Co. v. Williamson, 51 Minn. 53, 52 N.W. 986 (1892); Valentine v.
Woods, 59 Misc. 471, 110 N.Y. Supp. 990 (S. Ct. App. Term, 1908).
" I Tiffany, Landlord & Tenant 1238-41 (1910).
12 Daly 393, 67 How. Pr. 76 (N.Y.C.P., 1884).
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preferable. 4 The operative facts necessary for the justification under
one theory need not necessarily be as strong as under another. To sus-
tain the defense of constructive eviction the tenant must show that
the breach of duty by the lessor was of a serious nature which caused
a substantial interference with the possession or enjoyment of the
premises 5 On the other hand it has been asserted in some of the
cases justifying abandonment on contractual doctrines that the de-
gree of lessened enjoyment is not material; that the rights are to be
measured by the written contract and not by the consequences flow-
ing therefrom."'
Whether the choice of theory makes a difference should be partic-
ularly scrutinized in cases where a lessor covenants to put the premises
in a certain condition or to make substantial repairs before the com-
mencement of the term or within a reasonable time thereafter when
the premises have been leased for a known use. The courts seem to be
rather liberal in finding such covenants to be conditions precedent. 7
Such a finding obviates the necessity of finding facts which would
justify a constructive eviction.98
An inadequate understanding or presentation of applicable theories
has often resulted in poor pleading with the effect that the courts have
sometimes had difficulty in understanding what the defendant was
pleading and what result he expected to achieve. 9 At times the plead-
"See I Am. Law of Property 282 (1950), that most courts prefer the constructive
eviction theory over contract theory and that there are considerable variations of
both. See also, Everson v. Albert, 261 Mich. 182, 246 N.W. 88 (1933) for a decision
on constructive eviction in a state which has been the foremost exponent of the fail-
ure of consideration doctrine.
" 1 Am. Law of Property 282 (1952); Rapacz, Constructive Eviction, I De Paul
L. Rev. 69, 89 (1951).
"Craven v. Skobba, 108 Minn. 165, 121 N.W. 625 (1909) (the lessor covenanted to
put a house in a certain condition of cleanliness and repair and to paint the outside
at once or within a reasonable time. Held, that the tenant was justified in abandon-
ing the house when the outside painting was not done within one month after the
tenant took possession although all other stipulated work of decorating the inside had
been completed). But cf., United Cigar Stores of America v. Hollister, 185 Minn.
534, 242 N.W. 3 (1932), that the breach must be substantial of some essential
covenant.
"Papanastos v. Heller, 227 Mass. 74, 116 N.E. 732 (1917); Petersen v. Slauf Mfg.
Co., 251 Ill. App. 202 (1929); also text of this paper under Failure to Perform Con-
ditions Precedent.
" Petersen v. Slauf Mfg. Co., 251 111. App. 202 (1929).
10Laveites v. Gottlieb, 115 Misc. 218, 187 N. Y. Supp. 452 (S. Ct. Sp. Term, 1921)
(the court was unable to determine whether it was a covenant or condition because
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ing has contained nothing more than a conclusion of the pleader with
nothing specifically stated upon which to predicate any defense. 100
A plea that the premises became untenantable but which failed to
state and prove what caused it and whether the condition occurred
before or after the leasing was inadequate. 10 The courts have had
occasion to remark upon inadequate pleading most frequently in the
cases where tenants sought to justify abandonment because of alleged
fraudulent representations10 2 or fraudulent concealment.10 3 In addi-
tion to alleging fraud and concealment as specifically as possible, the
pleader must allege the facts which constitute it.'
The pleader should not overlook the possibility of more than one
string to his bow in choosing theory.'0° He cannot be certain at the
outset which theory may prove to be most appealing to the court on
a particular set of facts or which theory his evidence will sustain
best.1 6 If a defense on contract theory is being relied upon, it is
of poor pleading and insufficient evidence of what the language of the lease was);
see also, York v. Stewart, 21 Mont. 515, 55 Pac. 29 (1898); Haines v. Downey, 86 Ill.
App. 373 (1899).
"®Haines v. Downey, 86 Ill. App. 373 (1899).
"°
tFlannery v. Simons, 47 Misc. 123, 93 N.Y. Supp. 544 (S.Ct. App. Term, 1905).
See also, York v. Stewart, 21 Mont. 515, 55 Pac. 29 (1898) (there was a failure of the
water supply and the tenant quit. Held, that the tenant was liable because he had not
pleaded or shown why the supply failed).
" See York v. Stewart, 21 Mont. 515, 55 Pac. 29 (1898) (the tenant was denied the
right to go into the question of fraudulent representations because he failed to plead
them).
" Owens v. Ramsey, 213 Ky. 279, 280 S.W. 1112 (1926) (tenant failed to plead
fraudulent concealment).
"°Black v. Dick, 15 Mont. 236, 38 Pac. 1072 (1895) (the court pointed out that
there was no plea of concealing any fact which the tenant did not have a full oppor-
tunity of informing himself); Coulson v. Whiting, 12 Daly 408 (N.Y. C.P., 1884)
(the court refused to hear proof of facts which were not pleaded); Leech v. Hus-
bands, 34 Del. (4 W.W. Harr.) 362, 152 Atl. 729 (1930).
" In Everson v. Albert, 261 Mich. 182, 246 N.W. 88 (1933), it seems that only con-
structive eviction was relied upon in a jurisdiction very favorable to the failure of
consideration doctrine. The facts may also have been sufficient to justify a plea of
fraudulent representation and concealment.
"0 Hoopes v. Long, 40 Ariz. 25, 9 P. 2d 196 (1932) (the tenant pleaded the invalidity
of the lease and lost, the court telling him that had he pleaded the failure of the lessor
to furnish an adequate heating system, he might have won by then basing his defense
on constructive eviction); Tallman v. Earle, 3 Misc. 76, 23 N.Y. Supp. 17 (C.P., 1893)
(the tenant defended unsuccessfully on the ground of surrender but was allowed to
get his case to the jury by a timely amendment of his pleading so as to charge a con-
structive eviction).
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important to plead failure of consideration with care because that is
the heart of the theory. 0 7 Without exhausting the remarks of the
courts upon the subject of inadequate pleading, the words of a cer-
tain judge concerning several defenses seem most appropriate to con-
clude the point. Said the judge:
The defenses asserted . . . may actually be without merit, but they are not
bad pleading, and they do entitle the defendant to its day in court.108
"Whittaker v. Holmes, 165 Ark. 1, 263 S.W. 788 (1924) is an example of good
pleading in such cases.
" Gamble-Robinson Co. v. Buzzard, 65 F 2d 950, 955 (C.A. 8th, 1933). In Stevens &
Co. v. Pratt, 119 Wash. 232, 205 Pac. 10 (1922) the court justified the abandonment
on the several theories of breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment, failure of consid-
eration, and constructive eviction.
